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BARACK OBAMA'S WAR ON TERROR
POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE
PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11. Jack Goldsmith. 1 New York:
W. W. Norton & Co. 2012. Pp. xvi + 311. $26.95 (Cloth).
William E. Scheuerman 2
President Barack Obama's updated version of the so-called
war on terror has received something of a "free pass" from most
political and legal scholars. 3 To be sure, civil libertarians at the
ACLU, Center for Constitutional Rights, and other activist
4
organizations, as well as liberal voices on the editorial pages of
the New York Times, 5 have pilloried Obama for his failure to
fulfill what appeared to be a heartfelt 2008 campaign promise to
dramatically reverse his conservative predecessor's controversial
counterterrorism policies. Yet nothing akin to the avalanche of
critical books or journal articles burying President George W.
Bush's policies has emerged thus far. In part, the difference
stems from Obama's admirable decision to abandon the Bush
Administration's embrace of so-called "enhanced interrogation"
(i.e., torture ). 6 The silence likely stems as well from the partisan
preferences of law professors and political scientists, many of
whom instinctively sympathize with Obama and his Democratic
Administration. Those defensive instincts have surely been
reinforced, albeit inadvertently, by right-wing critics like Dick
Cheney and Rudy Giuliani, neither of whom seems willing to
miss an opportunity to appear before the TV cameras in order to
denounce Obama for being "weak on terrorism." 7
1.
2.
3.

Henry L. Shattuck Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
Professor of Political Science, Indiana University (Bloomington).
I thank my colleague Sumit Ganguly for the (hopefully) felicitous phrasing

here.

4. See, e.g., Rights Groups File Challenge to Killings of Three Americans in U.S.
Drone Strikes, CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, http;//ccrjusice.org/newsroom/
press-releases/rights-groups-file-challenge- killings-of-three-Americans-U.S. -drone-strikes
(last visited Dec. 28, 2012).
5. See, e.g., No Penalty for Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 4, 2012, at A26.
6. See Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009).
7. See, e.g., Kevin Robillard, Cheney: Obama is Worse than Carter, POLITICO (July
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So it probably should come as no surprise that the best
available account of the Obama Administration's version of the
war on terror comes from one of our leading conservative jurists,
Jack Goldsmith, in his new and provocative volume. More
unexpected is that if Goldsmith's description of Obama's policies
and his Administration's legal justifications is to be believed,
some of the President's vocal critics on Fox News can probably
calm down: as Goldsmith for the most part convincingly outlines,
continuities outnumber discontinuities as far as Obama's
relationship to his Republican forerunner goes (pp. 3-48). Most
surprising perhaps, Goldsmith seems at least broadly
appreciative of- if not always enthusiastic about- the basic
outlines of Obama's present political and legal brew, seeing in it
the product of fruitful institutional learning that has
characterized lJ.S. policy since 9/11 (p. xii). For those vexed
about indefinite detention, Abu Ghraib, and Guantanamo Bay,
Goldsmith offers some reassuring words. Despite some blemishes, the U.S. polity, blessed with a thriving civil society and
firmly institutionalized checks and balances operating effectively
to counter extreme policies, has in fact performled reasonably
well since 9/11: President Bush was eventually forced to
reconsider counterproductive and legally dubious policies (e.g.,
torture) (p. xii). Because of our resilient and indeed selfcorrecting constitutional system, fruitful pushback not only
encouraged officials to abandon such policies, but along the way
vital lessons have been learned about how best to navigate what
Goldsmith sees as a more-or-less permanent state of emergency
(pp. xiv-xvi). Although Obama's present-day policies are by no
means flawless, he has not only built on the lasting achievements
of the Bush Administration's version of the war on terror, but
has also sensibly tried to render them consonant with
longstanding U .S.-backed legal ideals (pp. 5-20). Best of all,
Obama has been driven to do so partly because he faces
pressures like those which similarly forced President Bush to
give ground (p. 24). Pace scholars on both the left and right who
depict the present-day presidency as effectively uncontrolled by
institutional and constitutional means, Goldsmith underscores
crucial ways in which it continues to confront oftentimes
imposing constraints.x
30, 2012), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0712/79112.html.
i-1.

BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
MATTHEW CRENSON & BENJAMIN GINSBERG, PRESIDENTIAL POWER:
UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED (2007); ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE

(2010):
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Providing a hardheaded yet surprisingly sympathetic look at
President Obama's policies, Goldsmith's volume provides
illuminating reading for anyone interested in the political and
legal vagaries of post 9/11 U.S. counterterrorism. Unfortunately,
the author's insufficiently critical view of the U.S. constitutional
system leads him not only to exaggerate its successes in dealing
with terrorism, but also to distort some of the complexities of
counterterrorism under the Obama Administration.
I. IN GEORGE W. BUSH'S FOOTSTEPS

Many readers of this journal are already familiar with the
fact that Goldsmith served as Assistant Attorney General in the
Office of Legal Counsel between October 2003 and June 2004,
before running afoul of precisely those Bush Administration
officials who supported far more outlandish views about
9
executive prerogative. So his present volume represents an
implicit attempt to provide an ex post facto justification for the
more moderate course he advocated under President Bush, as
well as a clear suggestion that voices like his won the war even if
they lost the internecine bureaucratic battles: counterterrorism
law and policy not only positively evolved in the direction sought
by moderate conservatives like Goldsmith who were abrasively
pushed aside by their rivals, but President Obama has relied
heavily on the Bush Administration's approach between 2006
and January 2009: "The bottom line is that it copied most of the
Bush counterterrorism program as it stood in January 2009,
expanded some of it, and narrowed a bit" (p. 5).
To be sure, Goldsmith concedes that Obama has broken
decisively with his precursor's positions in some crucial arenas.
Most dramatically, Obama has disavowed the Bush
Administration's early endorsement of torture (p. 14), and
despite sizeable political opposition also released significant
quantities of previously classified documents about recent U.S.
interrogation practices, some of which provide absolutely
harrowing details. 10 Obama also cut loose from Bush by closing
EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010): FREDERICK A.O.
SCHWARZ, JR. & AZIZ Z. HUQ, UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL
POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR (2007); PETER M. SHANE, MADISON'S NIGHTMARE: HOW
EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2009).

9.

For his own perspective on his battles within the Bush Administration, see

JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION (2007).

10.

Al-Qaeda militants Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed "were
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down so-called offshore "black sites" where suspected terrorists
were subjected to controversial forms of interrogation and
detainment, while forthrightly reaffirming the U.S. commitment
to the relevant Geneva conventions concerning the humane
treatment of prisoners (p. 16). He also has moved away from
making constitutionally tendentious claims concerning inherent
executive power, instead tending to appeal to statutory
legislation (e.g., Congress's September 18, 2001 authorization
"to use all necessary and appropriate forces" against those
aiding or abetting the 9/11 attacks) as a legal justification for his
actions (pp. 39-41). As part of a noteworthy shift in the
rhetorical (and sometimes legal) framework under which
counterterrorism is now waged, the bellicose language of "war
on terror" has pretty much vanished from A.dministration
statements, the dubious legal category of "enemy combatant" is
no longer deployed, and, most importantly, even when pursuing
actions seemingly reminiscent of his predecessor's, the Obama
Administration generally highlights their alleged compatibility
with basic rule of law virtues (e.g., the right to a fair hearing)
(pp. 40-41). Even though Goldsmith sometirnes wants to
downplay the degree to which this move represents significantly
more than improved political "packaging" ,11 he concedes that
Obama's rule of law rhetoric has not only generated political
capital for the president, but has also shaped some key facets of
U.S. counterterrorism (pp. 39-48).
Admitting that such changes remain considerable,
Goldsmith nonetheless proceeds to make a strong case in
defense of his thesis that "Obama [has] continued almost all of
his predecessor's counterterrorism policies" (p. x). In this vein,
Obama has publicly renewed President Bush's declaration of a
"national emergency" from September 14, 2001, and elsewhere
has frequently taken over-or at most modestly altered-core
Bush-era legal arguments and doctrines. Although its public
rhetoric might suggest otherwise, the Administration continues
to insist that the U.S. remains at war with Al-Qaeda, and it still
asserts far-reaching executive authority to combat terrorism by
appealing to the vast and arguably unwieldy delegations of
waterboarded hundreds of times. Others were subjected to eleven straight days of sleep
deprivation." DANIEL KLAIDMAN, KILL OR CAPTURE: THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE
SOUL OF THE 0BAMA PRESIDENCY 73-74 (2012).
11. For an alternative view that takes Obama's rule of law "packaging" somewhat
more seriously, see David Cole, Obama and Terror: The Hovering Questions, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS (July 12, 2012) http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/jul/12/obama-andterror-hovering-questions/.
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authority promulgated right after the 9/11 attacks (e.g.~ the
congressional declaration of war against Al-Qaeda) (pp. 5-6).
Like his conservative predecessor, Obama relies on the
controversial Patriot Act- whose renewal he supported- to
legitimize some of his policies (p. 16). Nor has the Obama
Administration bothered to explain when~ if ever, the ongoing
war on terror and/or "state of emergency" will conclude (p. 2122). Not surprisingly, the Administration has continued many
and perhaps most of the extensive forms of intelligence
gathering and surveillance employed by Bush (pp. 16-17). As
Goldsmith points out, Obama has even tellingly "approved the
construction of a $1.5 billion, one-million-square-foot NSA data
center" in Utah equipped with state-of-the art cybersecurity
tools (p. 17).
Despite Obama's initial promise to close it down,
Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) remains open and operative, albeit
on a smaller scale (i.e., with only 167 detainees 12 ) than under
Bush (pp. 11-12). Even if blame for this failure can by no means
be placed solely or perhaps even chiefly at Obama's feet, he has
followed Bush in endorsing indefinite detention for some
suspected terrorists, many of whom will apparently remain in
more-or-less permanent limbo at GTMO (pp. 12-13). Similarly,
the Obama Administration reformed, but by no means
abandoned, the system of military commissions inherited from
the Bush Administration (p. 9). While the commissions now look
quite different from the kangaroo courts initially sought by
former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and others, in part
because of some real procedural improvements (p. 187), the
overall picture remains sobering: the Administration is still
fighting off legal challenges to its attempt to give base
commanders carte blanche authority over visits by legal counsel,
along with discretion to decide how lawyers can use classified
13
information they may glean from detainees they represent.
Again reminiscent of its forerunner, the Obama
Administration continues to practice rendition, and though most
evidence suggests that it has done so more humanely, the legal
test it employs for determining where to send accused terrorists
remains unchanged: only if there is more than a 50°/o chance of
12.

U.S. Names 55 Set .for Tran\ferfrom Guantanamo. N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 21,2012, at

A6.
13. See e.g., Jane Sutton, U.S. Judge Blocks New Restrictions on Guantanamo
Lawyers, REUTERS (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/06/us-usaguan tanamo-idUSB RE8851 E 720120906.
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detainees facing torture in a particular country are officials
prohibited from sending them there (p. 15). Similarly, even
though it has improved screening and procedural protections for
detainees, the Administration also argues that basic habeas
corpus protections do not cover those captured overseas (e.g., in
Afghanistan) (p. 13). It seems as well to have appropriated the
Bush Administration's hard line views on state secrecy, fighting
no less aggressively in using it to dismiss lawsuits challenging its
policies (e.g., in recent legal challenges to "targeted killings" of
suspected terrorists) (pp. 13-14, 17-19). Like the Bush
Administration, Obama 's Administration insists on its right to
engage in forum shopping: only when it is legally and politically
convenient will suspected foreign-born terrorists get their day in
civilian court (pp. 10-11). Moreover, as the New York Times
editors recently commented, "[a ]ny remaining hope for imposing
meaningful accountability for torture and other abuses
committed" under the Bush Administration has "for all practical
purposes" now ended. 14 Even those CIA interrogators who likely
tortured prisoners to death, going well beyond even those
suspect interrogation practices condoned by President Bush, will
15
not be facing prosecution under Attorney General Eric Holder.
Last but by no means least, the Obama Administration has
gone beyond anything President Bush attempted in one major
area: he has dramatically ramped up the targeted killing of
suspected terrorists abroad, even claiming legal authority to
kill-and then proceeding to do so-a U.S. citizen, Anwar alAulaqi, and then turning to Bush-era legal doctrines to beat
back a courtroom challenge from the ACLU (pp. 13-14, 18-19).
As Newsweek journalist Daniel Klaidman shows in his aptly
entitled Kill or Capture: The War on Terror and the Soul of the
Obama Pre,\'idency, an insightful account of the Administration's
internal battles about counterterrorism, targeted killings,
preferably by means of drones, quickly became the
Administration's favored device for combating terrorism for a
mix of interlocking political and legal imperatives. 16 They allow
the Administration to minimize unnecessary U.S. military
casualties in a seemingly endless war on terror, while typically
garnering strong public support and permitting Obama to
accentuate his image as a strong leader tough on national

14.
15.
16.

No Penalty for Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15,2012, at A22.
/d.
See KLAIDMAN, supra note 10, at 117-43.
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17

security issues. Just as conveniently, they do not require
capturing and detaining dangerous terrorists, which has become
a political and legal morass given congressional hostility to trying
foreign terrorists in ordinary courts as well as the
Administration's own commitment to downsize Gitmo and other
offshore detention centers.'H Despite widespread condemnation
from abroad, the Administration continues to favor targeted
killings as its weapon of choice in the war on terror. In fact, they
have even garnered the unlikely imprimatur of one of the
Administration's most prominent liberal jurists, State
Department Legal Advisor and Yale Law School professor
Harold Koh, who interprets them- when targets are properly
selected- as legitimized by the U.S. declaration of war against
9
Al-Qaeda.' Nonetheless, they remain controversial for one
straightforward reason: President Obama has taken it upon
himself to serve as judge, jury, and executioner even in cases
involving U.S. citizens.
Civil libertarians may be exaggerating somewhat when they
dub Obama's war on terror "Bush Lite." Nonetheless, a
powerful case can be made that Obama has in fact mostly
followed in his predecessor's footsteps, and that at least in one
arena (i.e., targeted killings) he has in fact radicalized
Bush-era
employment of one suspect, controversial
antiterrorism tool.
II. BARACK OBAMA AS ENIGMA
Such continuities leave us with an obvious enigma. As
Goldsmith recounts, in 2008, Obama campaigned aggressively
against the Bush Administration's counterterrorism program
and its embrace of torture (p. 4). Of course, presidents often fail
to fulfill promises made on the campaign trail. Yet Obama's
commitment to a fundamental overhaul seemed to represent
something more than the usual political tool employed to win
over some segment of the electorate. A longstanding and
eloquent defender of the rule of law, former editor of the
Harvard Law Review, protege of some of our most prominent
liberal jurists (e.g., Laurence Tribe), and former law professor at

17. /d.atll9-22.
18. In Pakistan, he tween 2004 and 2007, there were nine drone attacks authorized
by the Bush Administration; in 2010 Obama authorized 111. KLAIDMAN, supra note 10,
at 117.
19. /d. at 215-20 (discussing Koh's evolving views on targeted killing).
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the University of Chicago, Obama seemed genuinely committed
to dramatic policy and legal changes. Based on his own
legislative record, as well as his soaring rhetoric, and last but not
least the fact that popular anxiety about terrorism was no longer
dominating the U.S. political landscape by 2008 and 2009, many
observers quite sensibly expected that we would see major
changes in counterterrorism. Adding to the enigmta's complexity
is a large body of recent evidence corroborating the deeply
rooted nature of Obama's constitutionalist and legalist instincts;
Klaidman's Kill or Capture describes numerous episodes in the
last four years when the President at least initially joined forces
with so-called "idealistic" defenders of the rule of law (in
particular, Attorney General Holder) in opposition to political
operatives (e.g., Rahm Emmanuel) whose primary job was to
guarantee their boss's political success rather than restore the
20
rule of law. At least on some occasions (for example, when
supporting the release of secret documents about U.S.
interrogation practices), he did so at considerable political risk.
So why has Obama failed to transform U.S. counterterrorism policy? The most obvious answer is one Goldsmith
fails to examine at length, even though it has garnered a sizeable
following among Obama's disappointed liberal supporters as
well as some journalists like Klaidman. It zeroes in on Obama's
failings as a political leader: his Administration has simply
messed things up, with an indecisive chief executive too often
ineptly overseeing an array of top-level officials and advisors
deeply divided over how and when to overturn Bush-era policies
on terrorism. President Obama has failed decisively to set the
agenda, either vis-a-vis his own cabinet, or in relation to the
public at large. As David Cole has recently pointed out in this
vein, President Obama has given up even trying to employ the
presidential bully pulpit, here as in other policy arenas too often
letting demagogical critics define the terms of the debate. 21
Predictably perhaps, he has ended up deferring at crucial
junctures to the "old hands" in the federal security and
intelligence apparatus. As Goldsmith accurately chronicles,
many of Obama's top advisors on terrorism have in fact been
rather conservative political figures, a number of whom worked
for President Bush (Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, for
example) (p. 27). His point man on counterterrorism, CIA
20. See, q;., KLAIDMAN, supra note 10, at 61-63 (discussing the decision to release
the torture memos).
21. See Cole, supra note II.
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Director John Brennan, previously spent twenty-five years in
intelligence and served as George Tenet's Chief of Staff while
the Bush Administration pursued its new interrogation program
(pp. 28). Not surprisingly, when push came to shove, Obama
opted to pursue a cautious path, following the advice of those
deeply enmeshed in the apparatus of the national security state
while regularly ignoring dissenting voices from the human rights
community and his own home base, the liberal legal academy.
Even if this explanation carries some weight, it suffers from
one glaring weakness: as Klaidman's own useful play-by-play
political account nicely lays out, when in 2009 Obama did
arguably try to lead the way in pursuing an alternative policy
course, in part by means of a series of forceful public
pronouncements about the need to redesign counterterrorism
more in sync with U.S. legal ideals, his efforts ignited destructive
political fires within his "own" Democratic Congress and outside
of it as well. Most obviously, his modest but eloquently
articulated efforts to close down GTMO and try Al-Qaeda
leaders like Khalid Sheik Mohammed in federal court were
aggressively rebuffed by Congress, which quickly and
overwhelmingly moved to prohibit him from transferring
22
detainees to prisons within the U.S. (The vote in the
Democratic controlled Senate was 90-6 against Obama, with
only six Democrats supporting his efforts; the House vote in
favor of the revealingly entitled "Keep the Terrorists Out of
23
America Act" drew similarly massive bipartisan support. )
Revealingly, Klaidman chronicles that with Obama's stamp of
approval, Attorney General Holder released classified materials
about Bush-era torture practices in part probably hoping for a
public outcry which might then open the door to a congressional
24
investigation and perhaps criminal prosecution. Holder in fact
got his outcry; however, it took a different tone than he
apparently expected: the conservative right-in alliance with Fox
News and other major media outlets-provided the Attorney
General with his first (of many) political shellackings. ~ Obama
and Holder soon found themselves running for political cover,
mercilessly abandoned even by Senator Harry Reid and other
2

22.
23.
24.
25.

See KLAIDMAN, supra note 10, at 105-72.
/d. at 89, 156.
/d. at 73.
Trish Ponder, Republicans Holding Obama Nominees Hostage to Block Release
of Bush Torture Memos, PENSITO REV. (Apr. 10, 2009), http://www.pensitoreview.

com/2009/04/10/republicans-holding-obama-nominees-hostage-to-block-release-of-bushtorture-memos/.
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prominent members of the president's own party when word
26
leaked about the plan to relocate Uighur GTMO detainees.
So it is perhaps wishful thinking to believe that if Obama
had been more effective at using his political capital he might
also have been much more successful in changing Bush-era
policies. Even if political errors were undeniably made, this
explanation underplays the key role of what now appears to be
deeply rooted opposition within both Congress and what now
passes in the U.S. for civil society to a genuine liberalization of
U.S. counterterrorism. Needless to say, this political climate
raises many fundamental questions about contemporary U.S.
democracy and the apparent willingness of so rrtany of its key
players to sacrifice basic legal protections and rule of law
guarantees in the face of terrorist threats, real or otherwise.
These unsettling trends perhaps stem in part from the modern
presidential executives oftentimes neglected links to traditional
monarchy, whose main function as "protector of the realm" had
27
far-reaching institutional as well as symbolic implications. Not
surprisingly perhaps, contemporary proponents of an outsized
executive increasingly seem willing to embrace and even
2
celebrate the U.S. presidency's monarchical origins. K
In any event, Obama perhaps should have done n1ore to
change the political climate. However, one can also easily
understand why competing political pressures (e.g., his
commitment to getting health care reform through Congress)
soon encouraged him to place the battle for a revised
counterterrorism program on the back burner: the opposition to
real change seemed so deep, and the political costs of
challenging it correspondingly exorbitant.
Goldsmith pays more attention to another explanation we
might characterize as the "institutional realist'' position.
According to this view, governing is different fron1 campaigning.
Now sitting in the Oval Office, and forced to read daily briefings
about ongoing terrorist plots against U.S. citizens, the world
inevitably looks very different to Obama than it did from the
U.S. Senate or on the campaign trail in Iowa or Oregon (p. 25).
"[T]he grim reality of presidential responsibility" inexorably
26. KLAIDMAN. supra note I 0, at 109.
27. For a critical take on the monarchist attributes of the U.S. presidency, see
William E. Scheuerman, American Kingship?: Monarchical Origins of Modern
Presidentialism, 37 POLITY 24-53 (2005).
28. JOHN YOO. THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005).

2013]

BOOK REVIEWS

529

transformed Obama (p. 26). Obama inherited a vast array of
institutions, practices, and norms, many of which are relatively
impermeable to dramatic alteration for reasons known to
anyone familiar with the workings of complex bureaucracies. In
this vein, GTMO was only the most egregious constitutional and
political mess dropped at Obama's front door at his new home in
the White House (p. 27). Not surprisingly, the choreography of
closing down GTMO rapidly turned out to be more complex
than Obama anticipated, in part because of its estimated fortyfour hardcore detainees, many of whose rights had been violated
by "enhanced interrogation," leaving Obama with the unenviable and perhaps impossible task of closing down GTMO
without simultaneously releasing genuine security threats who
could no longer be successfully prosecuted in ordinary courts
29
because of tainted and probably inadmissible evidence. From
Obama's perspective, the choice must have appeared tragic: he
could let Al-Qaeda sympathizers-and likely some of its most
heinous masterminds-go free and thereby uphold the rule of
law, but only at the cost of a potential security disaster and
massive political backlash.
Even if this narrative provides part of the solution to the
enigma, it still misses something fundamental. For example, it
probably fails to account for the surprisingly across-the-board
contours of the continuities between Bush and Obama. While
one can easily grasp why the mess at GTMO proved so
burdensome, it remains more difficult to understand why
internal institutional imperatives necessarily forced Obama to
continue his predecessor's surveillance policies, or why they
preclude prosecution of egregious human rights violations. Nor
can they easily explain Obama's apparent enthusiasm for
targeted killings. With every new resident in the White House
there is always an unavoidable element of bureaucratic
continuity. But why do we now observe so much of it precisely
where we might have predicted far-reaching reform?
To his credit, Goldsmith undertakes to provide an
alternative explanation; most of his volume is devoted to
providing a detailed defense of it. While the ACLU and other
civil libertarian groups are deeply worried about Obama's
borrowings from Bush, he sees them as basically praiseworthy.
In this account, a beneficial process of institutional learning has
transpired since 9/11, with U.S. officials coming to grasp that
29.

KLAIDMAN,

supra note 10, at 147.
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excessive assertions of executive prerogative, go-it-alone
unilateralism, and kneejerk anti-legalism are ineffective and
counterproductive in fighting terrorism (p. 38). According to
Goldsmith, by the final years of the Bush Administration, many
of the most important lessons had already been learned;
Obama's main policy-level contribution has been to fine-tune
Bush era policies and legal doctrines that were pretty much in
place by 2006 (pp. 38-39). What we now have is something
approaching a rough consensus concerning the broad outlines,
though not always the particulars (about which partisans will
legitimately continue to differ), concerning the appropriate
policy and legal bases of the war on terror. To be sure, the
learning process has been difficult and sometimes painful:
Congress, the courts, as well as civil society organizations like
the ACLU, whose positions Goldsmith otherwise criticizes, had
to fight back hard against President Bush (pp. 95-118). The same
institutional and civil society-based pressures, Goldsmith tells us,
have restrained President Obama: "Obama too felt the sting of
checks and balances when he tried and failed to close the
Guantanamo Bay detention facility and to prosecute 9/11
mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in civilian court" (p.
xiii). Nonetheless, the good news consists not only of our now
much improved counterterrorism programs, but also the fact
that checks and balances have worked along the lines pretty
much sought by James Madison and other Framers, even if they
have sometimes operated in a manner which might have
surprised them (p. xiii).
For Goldsmith, a "traditional focus on the President,
Congress, and the Supreme Court" needs to be supplemented by
a careful examination of "surprising lower-level forces, inside
and outside the government, that have been so consequential in
shaping presidential action" (pp. xiv-xv). Forces :in civil society,
in conjunction with institutional innovations potentially overlooked by a conventional view of the separation of powers, have
revitalized the U.S. version of checks and balances in accordance
with contemporary needs. Even if one might second guess
elements of President Obama's version of the war on terror,
Goldsmith argues, because of our political systen1's resilience it
has done a quite respectable job at grappling with terrorism (pp.
xv-xvi).
In an era of permanent emergency, none of us can perhaps
sleep soundly anymore. Yet those vexed about Obama's policy
debts to Bush, as well as the alleged but unproven institutional
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weaknesses of the U.S. version of liberal democracy, can now
put at least some of their anxieties to rest.
III. NOT YOUR MOTHER'S CHECKS AND BALANCES
Goldsmith outlines the successes of our updated system of
"distributed checks and balances" in his volume's central
chapters (pp. 51-204). Unfortunately, he overstates them.
For example, he begins by describing a thriving culture of
"accountability journalism," to which he ascribes "hundreds of
astounding journalistic successes since 9/11 in disclosing deep
governmental secrets" (p. 56). Equipped with the new
technologies of the digital age, journalists and activists have been
able to exploit the Achilles heel of a sprawling intelligence and
security apparatus, allegedly characterized by a "[w]idespread
disrespect of the secrecy system," to unmask the details of even
some highly classified materials (p. 71). Although he worries that
the trend towards transparency risks going too far, he tends to
praise the efforts of oftentimes solitary journalists, bloggers, and
others in spreading the word about some of the more extreme
measures pursued by the Bush Administration, and he views
their efforts as crucial for understanding why the war on terror
no longer rests on shaky legal and humanitarian foundations (pp.
79-82). Providing a fresh reminder of their sometimes heroic
role in opposing both an Administration hostile to its efforts, as
well as public opinion supportive of an aggressive military
response to Al-Qaeda, Goldsmith reminds us of the decisive role
played by Mark Danner, Seymour Hersh, Jane Mayer, and many
others in generating public criticism of indefinite detention,
torture, and other controversial counterterrorist instruments (pp.
30
65-67).
Unfortunately, the argument suffers from two flaws. First,
some of the alleged successes stories he recounts easily lend
themselves to a less optimistic gloss. As Goldsmith notes, as
early as October 2001 foreign journalists were reporting about
secret offshore U.S. prisons and controversial interrogation
practices (pp. 63, 65). Yet the story made little headway in the
U.S. until 2004 or so, when The New Yorker and other
30. See also MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB,
AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2004); SEYMOUR HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE
ROAD FROM 9/11 TO ABU GHRAIB (2004); JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE
STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS

(2008).
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publications began devoting significant attention to it (p. 66). As
Goldsmith admits, it was not until September 2006 that the Bush
Administration in fact acknowledged the existence of the secret
prisons and starting to clear them out (p. 67). }\. success story
perhaps, yet nonetheless one in which the Bush Administration
was able to pursue harsh interrogation measures with little
public scrutiny for a number of years, and in fact continued
doing so undeterred for nearly five years.
More fundamentally, here as elsewhere in his volume,
Goldsmith sometimes has a hard time showing exactly how
diffuse political pressures from civil society get effectively
funneled and employed by Congress and the Supreme Court in
order to rein in the presidency. He sometimes sirnply asserts the
existence of a connection between the two. A related tendency
to clump together-both analytically and erntpirically-civil
society with institutional checks and balances engenders another
problem: it becomes impossible to figure out exactly which
factors in his narrative are doing the real work of checking the
executive. Is it the free press and/or certain advocacy groups, the
traditional separation of powers and checks and balances, new
institutional devices which perhaps challenge our conventional
tripartite vision of government, or some combination thereof?
At least in principle, for example, political pressures from civil
society might restrain government officials even absent a
31
Madisonian version of institutionalized checks and balances.
When Goldsmith addresses the role of institutional checks,
rather than that played by journalists and activists in civil
society, he similarly exaggerates their successes in restraining the
executive. During much of the Brush presidency, Congress
remained at most a junior partner in the war on terror, regularly
bending over backwards to grant the executive discretionary
power to wage the war against Al-Qaeda as the executive alone
saw fit. To be sure, there were some exceptions~ most notably
the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which took aim at the Bush
Administration's excesses (pp. 185-86). But even Goldsmith
inadvertently concedes that many of Congress' at first glance farreaching attempts to regulate the Administration's treatment of
detainees proved modest at best. For example, while struggling
to defend his idiosyncratic view of the Military Cornmissions Act
of 2006 "as a defeat for the presidency and a victory for
31. See POSNER & VERMEliLE, supra note 8, at 4 (arguing that political but not
Madisonian legal or constitutional restraints now check the executive).
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Congress," he still admits that it "'reaffirmed Congress's reversal
of the Supreme Court's Rasul decision and once again
eliminated statutory habeas corpus review for GTMO
detaineesL]" while giving "the President many things he
wanted" (p. 187). If this represents defeat for the presidency,
what constitutes victory?
As noted above, Congress has in fact pushed back forcibly
against President Obama. However, its main efforts have
consisted of resisting his cautious quest to place the war on
terror on firmer legal footing by closing GTMO for example, or
placing accused terrorists under the auspices of the ordinary
courts. Especially since falling under Republican control in 2010,
Congress has typically tried to advance and sometimes codify
even more punitive and repressive policies than those sought by
Obama. Most recently, the 2012 defense appropriations bill
codifies indefinite military detention and effectively prohibits
the President from trying to bring accused terrorists before
32
ordinary courts.
Because of political pressure, Obama
ultimately decided to sign it, before then proceeding to
ameliorate some-but hardly all-of its draconian attributes. 33 In
short, Goldsmith's thesis that checks and balances have worked
effectively to counter executive excesses in the war on terror
only makes sense if you place recent attempts by President
Obama to move beyond his predecessor's arguably extreme
policies in the same category as President Bush's advocacy of
them. Congress has in fact constrained the presidency, hut not in
a manner which might have comforted James Madison: it has
waged battle against Obama's uneven efforts to dismantle some
34
features of the modern imperial presidency.
Too often, Goldsmith's assessment of our political system's
alleged institutional successes depends on underlying political
judgments, such as the tendentious view that President Obama's
liberal "excesses" can be treated as functionally equivalent to
the excesses of his predecessor. Unfortunately, this not only
tends to distort key features of the story, but it also leads the
32. DEP'T OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS BILL OF 2012, HR 1540, 112th Cong.
(2012).
33. See Talking Points: 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), ACLU,
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/talking-points-2012-national-defense-authorizationact-ndaa (last visited Jan. 3, 2013) (describing the ACLU's opposition to many of
thesordid provisions); see also KLAIDMAN, supra note 10, at 230-31.
34. ANDREW RUDALEVIGE, THE NEW IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY: RENEWING
PRESIDENTIAL POWER AFTER WATERGATE (2006) (updating the "imperial presidency"
thesis of executive power).
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author to find success where others rnight legitimately remain
deeply concerned: the baseline for "success" in institutional
terms unavoidably points to basic normative and political
preferences, whose centrality to his broader account Goldsmith
downplays. So he concludes by boldly declaring that "never
before has the Commander in Chief been so influenced, and
constrained, by law" (p. 208), triumphantly describing ours as a
system in which the executive is now checked and rendered
accountable in far-reaching and perhaps unprecedented ways.
What then about the obvious counterargument that no highlevel official who condoned torture, or even low-level
interrogators who practiced it, have yet to face prosecution?
According to Goldsmith, we need not worry too much because
"[t]he legality of the original CIA interrogation techniques
under the purposefully loophole-ridden torture law was always a
closer question than critics have publicly acknowledged," with
"many outstanding lawyers" concluding that "if exercised with
care" they "were lawful under then prevailing law" (p. 236). In
other words, his own judgment that we should be less alarmed
than many others have claimed (e.g., the ACLlJ) about what
transpired in the aftermath of 9/11 functions as an implicit
standard for praising our system of checks and balances. His
claim is rendered all the more odd since the volume's main thesis
is that productive institutional learning countered extreme and
counterproductive policies pursued by Bush. But which policies
does Goldsmith in fact have in mind if even the legality of
torture represents a "closer question" than civil libertarians
admit?
Analogously, Goldsmith sees the Supreme Court rulings in
Rasul, Hamdi, and Hamdan, and Boumediene as having
regularly "had a constraining impact on the President, his senior
national security advisers, and soldiers in the field" (p. 194). To
his credit, Goldsmith here effectively links institutional checks
on the executive to the civil society-based efforts of activists and
lawyers, many of whom have now fought for more than a decade
to guarantee that GTMO detainees and others enjoy basic rights
(pp. 194-96). Although much undoubtedly can be said in favor
of this view, Goldsmith only acknowledges- but never really
takes seriously- the position held by many of the actual activists
and lawyers about whom he reports, namely that their struggles
have chiefly produced limited and sometimes superficial
alterations to what remains a fundamentally immoral and
unconstitutional system for regulating detainees. In the blunt
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words of Michael Ratner at the Center for Constitutional Rights:
"We lost on the preventive detention issue, more or less. We lost
on the military commission issue, more or less" (p. 195). In short,
Goldsmith fails to consider sufficiently the substantive possibility
that the courts have done "too little, too late" in upholding basic
rights, while simultaneously ignoring an emerging scholarly
literature suggesting that the impact of even seemingly major
Supreme Court decisions has been limited. 35 Here again,
Goldsmith's own politically conservative preferences directly
shape his institutional analysis. In contrast, those readers of a
libertarian or left-liberal bent, more disappointed by the
judiciary's record since 9/11, might quite legitimately question
his relatively optimistic gloss on the post 9/11 courts.
For that matter, how secure will the institutional learning
process described by Goldsmith prove, for example, if
Republicans soon gain control of the presidency and Senate?
During the 2011 and 2012 Republican presidential primary
debates, the candidates at times struggled to outshine one
another in endorsing waterboarding and other suspect
interrogation techniques. 36
The book's most innovative section covers easily
overlooked but key lower-level institutional mechanisms within
our novel system of "distributed checks and balances."
Goldsmith writes at length and oftentimes insightfully about
what is now widely described as "lawfare," i.e., the tendency to
embed lawyers directly in military and security affairs, including
the nitty-gritty of the battlefield itself (pp. 223-33). Another
illuminating section discusses the increasingly major role of
Inspector Generals "sprinkled around the executive branch" and
given mandates to prevent wrongdoing and serve as internal
watchdogs (p. 99). Yet even if Goldsmith sometimes succeeds in
showing how such creative institutional innovations help
guarantee the executive's fidelity to the law, they remain
fundamentally internal to the executive branch, and thus
ultimately accountable- in both formal and countless informal
ways- to the president. At the very least, they diverge at least
35. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, What Good is Habeas?, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 385 (2010)
(discussing the limited impact of Boumediene). Revealingly, Klaidman's insider-focused
account of Obama Administration battles on the war on terror barely mentions the
judiciary; it does not seem to have figured much at all in their political calculations. See
KLAIDMAN, supra note 10.
36. Casey Glynn, Cain, Bachmann Say They Would Support Waterboarding, CBS
NEWS (Nov. 13,2011, 12:01 AM), www,cbsnews.com/8301-503544-162-57323716-50354411
cain-bachmann-say-they-would-support-waterboarding/.

536

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 28:519

somewhat from what Madison typically had in mind. To be sure,
Madison was no defender of a pure separation of powers, but
instead sought a system in which institutions were intermeshed
and expected to cooperate. 37 Yet checks and balances could only
work if differentiated institutions possessed effective tools (e.g.,
the executive veto) with which they could counter rivals.
Probably in part because of the unduly vague way in which
Goldsmith conceptualizes checks and balances and their ties to
civil society, his narrative generally occludes the degree to which
new institutional mechanisms do not in reality represent a mere
updated variant of "the framers' original design of making
presidential action accountable" (p. 209). Regrettably, his failure
to do so forecloses a serious consideration of the possibility that
the U.S. constitutional system has developed useful new
restraints on the executive only by means of devices incongruent
with original Madison's vision.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Even though Goldsmith's book succeeds in documenting
myriad ways in which President Bush has determined the
outlines of his successor's modestly revised version of the war on
terror, it suffers from two interconnected flaws. First, Goldsmith
never fully puts to rest the legitimate concern that our system is
now an imbalanced system of government, in which the
executive remains best situated to exploit terrorist threats, real
or otherwise, in order to expand its authority, and where neither
civil society nor institutional checks and balances work
sufficiently to restrain it. Tellingly, when Congress has recently
pushed back forcefully against the executive, it oftentimes has
done so in order to ward off cautious attempts to downsize the
imperial presidency and the weighty powers it has accrued over
the last decade. When checks and balances have come into play
since 9/11, they sometimes did so not-as Madison and other
classical writers hoped- in order to rein in executive excess, but
rather in order to provide it with a stronger statutory footing.
Second, Goldsmith ultimately offers a self-satisfied and
occasionally even smug view of the U.S. political system's
response to 9/ll, praising its ability to learn frorn its mistakes
and correct them. Yet that assessment tends to depend on
implicit political and normative preferences, many of which will
37. But see Posner & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 19-25 (arguing that Madison also
envisioned competition as a way for the branches to check and monitor each other).
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strike at least some readers as controversial and even
troublesome. For anyone more worried than Goldsmith
apparently remains about indefinite detention, targeted killings,
or the fact that presidential candidates from at least one of our
major parties continue to endorse torture, the last decade hardly
represents a bright spot in the long annals of U.S. constitutional
government.
So is our attempt to evaluate our political system's response
to 9/11 nothing more than a reflection of underlying political and
moral preferences? Of course not. If we are to solve the enigma
of Obama 's war on terrorism, we will need a systematic
comparative examination of how our presidential system has
performed in the face of terror attacks when compared to other
(e.g., parliamentary or semi-presidential) versions of liberal
democracy, in which checks and balances operate quite
differently. 3x Goldsmith is right to seek a solution to the enigma
by turning to an examination of U.S. constitutional mechanisms
and the separation of powers. However, his efforts founder in
part because they refuse to step outside the U.S. legal academy's
usual comfort zone and engage works in political sociology and
political science that raises broader questions of comparative
institutional design. Even if such comparative institutional and
legal inquiries still contain unavoidably normative moments,
they can provide us with a sounder empirical baseline for what
39
constitutes a "successful" response to terrorism. Like too many
others in the legal academy, Goldsmith seems uninterested in
making such comparisons, let alone in the possibility that we
might have something vital to learn from other countries'
political experiences with terrorism or emergency government.
Yet without pursuing such comparisons in a systematic and
rigorous manner, how can we be so sure that U.S. presidential
democracy has done reasonably well in fighting terrorism, or
even that it represents a sufficient institutionalization of modern
liberal and democratic ideals?

38. See William E. Scheuerman, Presidentialism and Emergency Government, in
EMERGENCIES AND THE LIMITS OF LEGALITY 258-86 (Victor V. Ramraj ed., 2008)
(describing the specific pathologies of presidentialism in the context of crisis or
emergency government).
39. THE "WAR ON TERROR" AND THE GROWTH OF EXECUTIVE POWER: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (John E. Owens & Riccardo Pelizzo, eds., 2010) (offering a
preliminary contribution to a broader comparative analysis).

